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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ERLING A. ROYLANCE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, Ct. App. Case No. 
860023-CA 
vs. 
LYNN B. ROWE, DEAN L. BRISTOW, Sup. Ct. Case No. 
J.R. MONNAHAN, and MOUNTAIN 19928 
VIEW HOSPITAL, 
Category 13 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS ROWE AND BRISTOW IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether Petitioner is entitled to review of the Utah Court 
of Appeals decision to affirm the trial court holding to not 
allow a res ipsa loquitur instruction to the jury? 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Rules 42-43, Rules of Utah Supreme Court, 56 Utah Adv. Rep. 
38 (May 4, 1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an action for medical malpractice arising out of 
emergency surgery performed in June, 1981. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition by the Court of 
Appeals. 
This case was tried to a jury beginning December 27, 1983, 
with the Honorable J. Robert Bullock presiding. The jury 
returned a special verdict wherein it found that neither 
Dr. Rowe nor Dr. Bristow was negligent. Judgment was entered 
January 5, 1984. A Motion for New Trial was filed, and Judge 
Bullock denied the motion on April 16, 1984. Plaintiff appealed 
the trial court's decision to the Utah Supreme Court. Plain-
tiffs appeal was assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals, Case 
No. 860023-CA, and set for hearing on April 27, 1987. Neither 
Appellant nor Respondents requested oral argument. The Utah 
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in an 
opinion filed May 12, 1987. Roylance v. Rowe, 57 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 34 (Ct. App. 1987). A copy of the opinion is attached 
hereto as Appendix MA." 
C. Statement of the Facts. 
The statement of facts set forth in plaintiff-appellant's 
petition is substantially accurate. There are, however, 
several points that need to be clarified. 
1. On page 3 of plaintiffs petition it states that the 
plaintiffs condition was determined on June 22, 1981. In 
fact, the condition was determined on June 12, 1981. (R. 474) 
2. The plaintiff states on page 5 of his petition that 
"Testimony offered from both plaintiff and defendants 
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established that the better procedure would have been to strip 
the plaintiff-patient and take more x-rays." If fact, neither 
Dr. Monnahan nor Dr. Bristow made these statements. (See R. 
466, 519) Rather, Dr. Monnahan said that additional x-rays may 
have shown the location of the sponge. (R. 461-62). 
3. Further, on page 6 of plaintiffs petition, it is said 
that M[t]he mere induction of additional anesthesia is poten-
tially hazardous." There are two problems with this state-
ment. First, Mr. Roylance was already under an anesthesia and 
reinduction was not necessary. He was merely given additional 
anesthetic. (R. 527) Secondly, there was no evidence intro-
duced at trial that the effect of such risk ever materialized 
or resulted in injury or damage. 
4. Finally, on page 7 of the plaintiff's petition it 
mentions that Mr. Roylance had an extended hospital stay and 
developed post-operative bleeding from the colon. Although 
these facts are true, the record is devoid of any evidence 
showing that these complications, or any of the complications, 
were caused by the second operation. 
In summary, plaintiff implies throughout his fact statement 
that he suffered horrendous injuries because of the exploratory 
surgery. In fact, there was no believable or competent 
testimony to prove that he suffered any injury. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Review by writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but 
of judicial discretion. The function of the Supreme Court is 
to grant review of decisions where important issues of law 
exist or serious error has occurred. 
The plaintiff contends that the petition should be granted 
because the trial court erred in not allowing a res ipsa 
loquitur instruction to the jury. The plaintiff's contention 
is mistaken for at least three reasons. Review by writ of 
certiorari is inappropriate in the instant case because plain-
tiff has failed to satisfy any justification that the Court 
will consider in granting such a writ. In addition, the evi-
dence introduced by the plaintiff at trial clearly and com-
pletely delineated how the plaintiff's injuries occurred. As a 
result of such evidence, there was nothing left for the jury to 
infer and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur had no applica-
tion. Finally, plaintiff improperly raises, for the first 
time, the claim that defendants were negligent as a matter of 
law. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
REVIEW BY WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS INAPPROPRI-
ATE IN THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE PETITIONER 
HAS FAILED TO SATISFY ANY JUSTIFICATION FOR 
GRANTING SUCH A WRIT 
Plaintiff seeks review by writ of certiorari. Rule 43 of 
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court set forth the character of 
reasons that will be considered in granting a review by writ of 
certiorari. See, Jurisdiction of Writ of Certiorari to Court 
of Appeals, 56 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (May 4, 1987). The pertinent 
portions of Rule 43 provide: 
(1) when a panel of the court of appeals has 
rendered a decision in conflict with a decision of 
another panel of the court of appeals on the same 
issue of law; 
(2) when a panel of the court of appeals has 
decided a question of state or federal law in a way 
that is in conflict with a decision of this court; 
(3) when a panel of the court of appeals has 
rendered a decision that has so far departed from the 
accepted and usual course of judicial proceeding or 
has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower 
court as to call for an exercise of this court's power 
of supervision; or 
(4) when the court of appeals has decided an 
important question of municipal, state or federal law 
which has not been, but should be, settled by this 
court. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that 
"certiorari is a discretionary writ." Boggess v. Morris, 635 
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P.2d 39, 42 (Utah 1981). See also, Rohwer v. District Court, 
41 Utah 279, 293, 125 P. 671 (1912). In discussing the 
exercise of such discretion, this Court noted: 
[t]hat discretion must be used sparingly so as not to 
undermine legislative authorizations fixing limits on 
the time and manner of appellate review. 
Boggess, 635 P.2d at 42. 
The function of the Supreme Court, as outlined in the sub-
sections of Rule 43, is to grant review only where substantial 
issues of law exist or serious error has occurred. See Mast v. 
Standard Oil Co. of California, 140 Ariz. 1, 680 P.2d 137, 138 
(1984). Faced with a similar Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
the Oregon Supreme Court helped clarify the role of a Supreme 
Court working in connection with a Court of Appeals. In 1000 
Friends of Oregon v. Board of County Commissioners, Etc., 584 
P.2d 1371, 1372 (Ore. 1978), the Court held that: 
[t]he function of this Supreme Court is no longer to 
afford every losing litigant a forum to review errors 
said to have been committed at trial or in an adminis-
trative hearing. That function is now placed in the 
Court of Appeals. Similarly, a party asserting that 
the Court of Appeals, in turn, has erred cannot for 
that reason alone expect further review in this court. 
The process must stop somewhere, and for most purposes 
this is at the first level of appeal. (Emphasis added) 
Much like this Court, Oregon has not set forth a set of 
criteria entitling a petitioner to review as of right, but 
rather, has required a petitioner to "present concrete reasons 
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why the importance of an issue transcends the importance of the 
case to the litigants-" 16. at 1373. 
Plaintiff's petition fails to "present any concrete reason" 
why the issues in this case "transcend the importance of the 
case to the litigants" and should be subject to further review. 
POINT II 
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR DOES NOT 
APPLY TO THE FACTS IN THIS CASE, 
Respondents do not dispute that res ipsa loquitur is an 
established legal principle in Utah. Given the proper facts 
and the proper testimony, a jury should be so instructed. This 
case does not present either the requisite facts or the 
requisite testimony. 
The facts of this case do not present a res ipsa loquitur 
situation. The historic reason for the development of the 
doctrine was to provide a means by which a plaintiff, who did 
not have access to the information necessary to prove actual 
negligence, could present a prima facie case. In fact, Mr. 
Roylance did present a successful prima facie case. The theory 
of negligence against the doctors was that they should have 
taken more x-rays before doing further surgery. The case was 
submitted to the jury on that specific theory of negligence. 
The jury just did not believe that the doctors were negligent. 
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It is paradoxical that appellant, having gone to great 
lengths at the trial to attempt to prove that Dr. Bristow and 
Dr. Rowe were negligent with regard to very specific activi-
ties, would then attempt to show that he did not have the 
information or ability within his control to present that 
evidence. In fact, Judge Bullock must, of necessity, have 
found that he presented a prima facie case, or the issue would 
not have been submitted to the jury. 
The Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion. The 
court held as follows: 
In this case, there is no dispute that the 
injury, the unnecessary second surgery, was caused by 
the defendant doctors. The doctors do not deny that a 
second surgery was performed to remove what appeared 
to be a sponge left inside the defendant; they do not 
deny that this surgery was performed following a cor-
rect sponge count but after a suspicious x-ray; they 
do not deny that the subsequent operation failed to 
locate any sponge or gauze. Inasmuch as the evidence 
introduced by Roylance clearly and completely delin-
eated how Roylance's injuries occurred, the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur has no application, as there is 
nothing left to infer. The jury was only required to 
determine if this conduct breached the requisite 
standard of care. The court therefore did not err in 
refusing to give Roylance*s proposed instruction on 
res ipsa loquitur. 
Roylance v. Rowe, 57 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, slip op. at 4 (Ut. App. 
1987). 
Secondly, the appellant did not plead the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur in his Complaint (R. 5-7). The issue was not 
raised at the pretrial conference (R. 167). It was first 
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raised at the conclusion of the evidence with a discussion of 
the proposed Jury Instructions took place (R. 802). In one of 
the early Utah cases dealing with res ipsa loquitur, the 
Supreme Court said: 
[W]e think one who wishes to rely on that [res ipsa 
loquitur] doctrine, as well as specifically assigned 
acts of negligence, must so plead, either by a sepa-
rate count or by proper allegation to the effect that 
the negligence to be inferred from the general situa-
tion caused the injury, thereby notifying the other 
party that he intends to rely on the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur. To set out by way of inducement a 
situation which itself may bespeak a prima facie case 
of negligence and then follow with allegations of 
specific negligence and allege by "by reason of such 
negligent acts and omissions on the part of the 
defendant the plaintiff was injured," etc., does not 
sufficiently put the defendant on notice that the 
plaintiff is going to rely on the situation itself to 
furnish any inference of negligence. 
Loos v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 99 Utah 496, 108 P.2d 254 at 
295 (1940). Clearly, the appellant did not put the respondents 
or the court on notice of his intent to rely on res ipsa 
loquitur. 
Finally, it is the contention of respondents that the 
plaintiff did not meet the burden of proving the first element 
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur: "That the accident was 
of a kind which, in the ordinary course of events, would not 
have happened had due care been observed." As early as 1934, 
the Utah Supreme Court has implied that in medical malpractice 
cases the plaintiff must produce expert testimony to prove that 
specific element of res ipsa loquitur. Pussey v. Budge, 85 
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Utah 37, 38 P.2d 712, 715 (1934). This certainly seems logical 
in light of this Court's ruling in numerous malpractice cases 
wherein it has said that standards of care must be established 
by expert medical testimony* See, e.g., Huggins v. Hicken, 6 
Utah 2d 233, 310 P.2d 523 (1957). 
The arguments advanced in this case are precisely the same 
as were before the Court in Joseph v. W.H. Grave Latter-Day 
Saints Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P.2d 935 (1960). The plain-
tiff in that case had failed to plead res ipsa loquitur. He 
had proceeded to trial claiming specific acts of negligence. 
He then urged that the case be submitted to jury with an 
instruction on res ipsa loquitur. The trial court denied his 
request and the jury returned a defense verdict. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court said it did not even need to 
address the first two issues — and moved on to decide whether 
the evidence justified submitting the case on the theory of res 
ipsa loquitur. In affirming the lower court decision, the 
Court said: 
It is realized that res ipsa loquitur has been applied 
in various fields where an injury occurs which is not 
to be expected if proper standards of care and skill 
are observed. But this is done only with caution, par-
ticularly in the medical field because of the realiza-
tion that many aspect of the treatment of human ills 
cannot yet be regarded as exact science and a bad 
result may result even though recognized standards of 
care and skill are employed. 
Id. at 938. 
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The facts in the present case do not present a legally 
sufficient basis for submission on the theory of res ipsa 
loquitur. Further, by failing to plead the theory, and by then 
proceeding to "successfully" present a prima facie case for 
specific acts of negligence the appellant was estopped from 
asserting the theory. The trial court properly instructed the 
jury and the case was properly affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT WILL NOT CONSIDER AN ISSUE NOT 
RAISED IN THE PLEADINGS OR IN THE TRIAL COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court has held in various cases that an 
issue not raised in the pleadings or at the trial court cannot 
be raised for the first time on appeal. Insley Mfg. Corp. v. 
Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 (Utah 1986); Madsen v. 
Brown, 701 P.2d 1086, 1088 (Utah 1985); Duckett v. Olsen, 699 
P.2d 734, 737 (Utah 1985). Issues which are "neither raised in 
the pleadings nor put in issue at the trial cannot be considered 
for the first time on appeal." Bundy v. Century Equipment Co., 
692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984); Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 
1320, 1322-23 (Utah 1982); Park City, Utah Corp. v. Ensign Co., 
586 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1978). "Issues not presented to the 
trial court for decision are not reviewable by this court, and 
we express no opinion on the issue." Trayner v. Cushing, 688 
P.2d 856, 857 (Utah 1984) . 
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Petitioner claims that the defendants were negligent as a 
matter of law. (Petition at p. 14). This claim is raised for 
the first time in this petition. Under these circumstances, 
*[i]t is axiomatic that defenses and claims not raised by the 
parties in the trial cannot be considered for the first time on 
appeal.- Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983). 
Furthermore, petitioner fails to cite authority to support 
this claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, 
but of judicial discretion. The petitioner has failed to show 
that the issue decided by the Court of Appeals was of substan-
tial importance or that the decision of the Court of Appeals is 
in conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of 
Appeals or with a decision of this Court. Thus, the plaintiff-
appellant's petition should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted this j2JL*/day of June, 1987. 
jgle 
Attorney for Def^^n^ants-Respondents 
Rowe and Bristow 
SCMDWS10 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Erling A. Roylance, 
Plaintiff and Appellant/ 
v. 
Lynn B. Rowe, Dean L. Bristow, 
J. R. Monnahan, and Mountain 
View Hospital/ 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 860023-CA 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Before Judges Billings/ Garff and Jackson 
F I L E D 
MAY! 21987 
BILLINGS/ Judge: 
Timothy M. Shea 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Plaintiff Roylance brought an action against Doctors Rowe 
and Bristow, and Mountain View Hospital for medical malpractice 
arising from surgery performed in June, 1981. At the 
conclusion of Roylance1s case-in-chief, defendant Mountain View 
Hospital was dismissed. Subsequently, the jury found the 
remaining two doctor defendants not negligent and judgment was 
entered in favor of defendants, no cause of action. Roylance 
seeks reversal claiming the trial court erred (a) in not 
granting a directed verdict in favor of plaintiff and in 
failing to allow a new trial based upon the weight of the 
evidence; (b) in denying plaintiffs requested jury instruction 
on res ipsa loquitur; and (c) in failing to dismiss defendant 
hospital at the commencement of trial. We affirm. 
Roylance entered Mountain View 
acute gangrenous perforated gallbl 
was performed by Drs. Rowe and Bri 
the scrub nurse counted the sponge 
matched the initial count. After 
incision, an x-ray was taken which 
4M x 4" piece of gauze. The docto 
external bandages and bed clothes 
determined a sponge had been left 
thereafter performed another opera 
gauze; no sponge or gauze was loca 
Hospital for removal of an 
adder. The emergency surgery 
stow. Following the surgery, 
s; the figures totaled and 
the doctors closed Roylance's 
revealed the presence of a 
rs checked Roylance's 
and finding nothing, 
internally. The doctors 
tion to locate the sponge or 
ted. This action was brought 
APPENDIX 
against Drs. Rowe and Bristow and Mountain View Hospital on 
grounds that Roylance was subjected to unnecessary surgery. 
Following a pre-trial settlement and release of Mountain 
View Hospital, Roylance unsuccessfully moved to dismiss 
Mountain View Hospital, The court, however, dismissed the 
hospital at the conclusion of Roylance's case-in-chief and 
directed a verdict in the hospital's favor. At the conclusion 
of the trial against the remaining two doctors, the court 
denied Roylance's requested jury instruction on res ipsa 
loquitur but submitted the issue of the defendants' negligence 
to the jury. The jury found the doctors were not negligent. 
The court then denied Roylance's motion for a new trial. 
I. 
Roylance tirst contends there was insufficient evidence to 
justify the jury's verdict of no cause of action on negligence 
and, therefore, the trial court erred in failing to grant 
Roylance's motion for a new trial. The law on this point is 
well established. Where the trial court has denied a motion 
for a new trial based upon insufficiency of evidence to justify 
the verdict, its decision will be sustained on appeal if there 
was an evidentiary basis for the jury's decision. The trial 
court's denial of the motion will be reversed only if the 
evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or so 
slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly 
unreasonable and unjust. Nelson v. Truiillo. 657 P.2d 730, 732 
(Utah 1982); S3JS. Hall v. Anderson, 562 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1977). 
The trial record contains ample evidence to support the 
jury's finding that the doctors were not negligent. We do not 
find the evidence supporting the jury's finding so lacking or 
unconvincing as to make the verdict unreasonable or unjust. 
II. 
Roylance next contends the trial court erred in failing to 
give the jury an instruction on res ipsa loquitur. Res ipsa 
loquitur is an evidentiary doctrine aiding in the proof of 
negligence. Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828, 834 (Utah 
1980). The purpose of res ipsa loquitur is 
to permit one who suffers injury from 
something under the control of another, 
which ordinarily would not cause injury 
except for the other's negligence, to 
present his grievance to a court or jury 
on the basis that an inference of 
negligence may reasonably be drawn from 
such facts; and cast the burden upon the 
other to make proof of what happened. 
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2£. at 833 (emphasis added) (citing Lund v. Phillips Petroleum 
£Q., 10 Utah 2d 276, 351 P.2d 952 (1960); £££ also Joseph v. W, 
H. Groves Latter Dav Saint Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P.2d 
935 (1960); White v Pinnev. 99 Utah 484, 108 P.2d 249 (1940). 
A res ipsa loquitur instruction is appropriate where a 
plaintiff is unable to pinpoint which act or omission on the 
part of a defendant breached a legally imposed standard of 
care.1 
Before being entitled to such a jury instruction, however, 
a plaintiff must show: 
(1) [T]hat the accident was of a kind 
which, in the ordinary course of events, 
would not have happened had due care been 
observed; (2) that the plaintiff's own 
use or operation of the agency or 
instrumentality was not primarily 
responsible for the injury; and (3) that 
the agency or instrumentality causing the 
injury was under the exclusive management 
or control of the defendant. 
Kusv v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp.. 681 P.2d 1232, 1235 (Utah 
1984) (citing Anderton, 607 P.2d at 833). 
Application of res ipsa loquitur is, however, premised on 
the plaintiffs inability to produce evidence identifying the 
precise negligent act or omission on the part of a defendant 
which caused the harm. There is no room for the operation of 
res ipsa loquitur where the evidence in the case reveals all of 
the facts and circumstances of the occurrence and clearly 
establishes the precise allegedly negligent act which is the 
cause of plaintiff's injury. See Kusv v. K-Mart Apparel 
Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d 1232# 1236 (Utah 1984). See also 
Crawford v. Rogers. 406 P.2d 189, 193 (Alaska 1965); Ballhorst 
v. Hahner-Forman-Cale, Inc.. 207 Kan. 89, 99, 484 P.2d 38, 46 
(1971); Hugo v. Manning. 201 Kan. 391, 395-98, 441 P.2d 145, 
149-51 (1968); Dabroe v. Rhodes Co., 64 Wash. 431, 392 P.2d 
317, 322 (1964). 
This does not mean that introduction of evidence of 
specific acts of negligence deprives a plaintiff of the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This jurisdiction has long held 
1. Although in the majority of medical malpractice cases, the 
plaintiff must introduce expert testimony to establish the 
standard of care, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized certain 
situations where expert testimony is unnecessary. Nixdorf v. 
Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980). We do not reach the 
issue in this case. 
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that a case presented to the jury on specific theories of 
negligence does not preclude an instruction on a theory of res 
ipsa loquitur. Anaerman Co. v. Edoemon. 76 Utah 394, 400, 290 
P. 169# 172 (1930). Rather, the rule may be summarized as 
follows: Where the three conditions for application of res 
ipsa loquitur have been established, a mere prima facia showing 
of specific negligence does not prevent its use. Under such 
circumstances the case should be submitted on both the theory 
of specific negligence and res ipsa loquitur. Thus, if proof 
by a plaintiff of specific acts of negligence on the 
defendants part does not furnish a complete explanation of the 
accident, as where there are alternative theories of 
negligence, there is still room for an inference of negligence 
arising from the happening of the accident. Where, however, 
proof of specific negligence goes so far as to reveal all the 
facts and circumstances and fully explain the alleged negligent 
cause of injury by positive evidence, res ipsa loquitur has no 
function. Kusy, 681 P.2d at 1236. 
In the case before us, Roylance argues that the second, 
unnecessary surgery was an accident which would not have 
happened had due care been observed, that Roylance was not 
responsible for the injury, and that the instrumentality 
causing the injury was under the exclusive control of the 
defendant doctors. Roylance concludes that, inasmuch as the 
three conditions of res ipsa loquitur have been satisfied, the 
court should have instructed on the doctrine. As the foregoing 
discussion makes clear, however, our analysis must not end. 
The issue remains whether at trial Roylance offered evidence of 
specific negligence so as to fully explain the alleged 
negligent cause of injury. If the evidence received at trial 
fully revealed all of the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the accident, res ipsa loquitur has no application. 
In this case, there is no dispute that the injury, the 
unnecessary second surgery, was caused by the defendant 
doctors. The doctors do not deny that a second surgery was 
performed to remove what appeared to be a sponge left inside 
the defendant; they do not deny that this surgery was performed 
following a correct sponge count but after a suspicious x-ray; 
they do not deny that the subsequent operation failed to locate 
any sponge or gauze. Inasmuch as the evidence introduced by 
Roylance clearly and completely delineated how Roylance's 
injuries occurred, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no 
application, as there is nothing left to infer. The jury was 
only required to determine if this conduct breached the 
requisite standard of care. The court therefore did not err in 
refusing to give Roylance's proposed instruction on res ipsa 
loquitur. In view of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to 
consider the other points raised by respondents. 
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III. 
Finally# Roylance contends the trial court erred in failing 
to dismiss defendant hospital at the commencement of trial. 
Prior to the commencement of trial, Roylance entered into a 
settlement agreement with defendant Mountain View Hospital 
relieving the hospital from liability to make contribution to 
the doctors pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-43 (1977).2 
Roylance moved to dismiss defendant Mountain View Hospital; 
defendant doctors argued that under § 78-27-43 Mountain View 
Hospital could not be dismissed from the action until the issue 
of proportionate fault had been litigated. The court denied 
Roylance1s motion and compelled Mountain View Hospital to 
remain a defendant until the completion of Roylance9s case. 
The pertinent section of the Utah Code provides: 
(1) A release by the injured person of one 
joint tort-feasor does not relieve him 
from liability to make contribution to 
another joint tort-feasor unless that 
release: 
(a) Is given before the right of the 
other tort-feasor to secure a money 
judgment for contribution has 
accrued; and 
(b) Provides for a reduction, to the 
extent of the prorata share of the 
released tort-feasor, of the injured 
person's damages recoverable against 
all the other tort-feasors. 
(2) This section shall apply only if the 
issue of proportionate fault is litigated 
between joint tort-feasors in the same 
action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-43 (1977). 
Roylance could relieve defendant Mountain View Hospital 
from liability for contribution only under the express 
provisions of § 78-27-43. Madsen v. Salt Lake Citv School Bd., 
645 P.2d 658, 663 (Utah 1982); £££ Thode, Comparative 
Negligence, Contribution Among Tort-Feasors, and the Effect of 
2. This case was decided prior to the 1986 modification of 
provisions relating to comparative negligence which, among 
other things, abolished joint and several liability and rights 
of contribution among joint tort-feasors. Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-27-38 to -43 (1986). 
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a Release—A Triple Plav bv the Utah Legislature, 1973 Utah L. 
Rev. 406, 431-33. As noted, this section specifically states 
that it shall apply only if proportionate fault is litigated 
between joint tort-feasors in the same action, as only then can 
the plaintiff$s judgment be proportionately reduced by the 
released tort-feasor*s established fault. 
Roylance cannot claim the benefits of § 78-27-43 to release 
Mountain View Hospital from liability to make contribution and 
at the same time deny defendant doctors the right to litigate 
the hospital's proportionate fault. The trial court did not 
err in denying Roylancefs motion to dismiss Mountain View 
Hospital at the commencement of trial. 
Judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs to 
respondent. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
R. W. Garff, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
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